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CONCLUSION
There is a certain amount of irony in the judicial reasoning which sustains
historical zoning on economic grounds. Such reasoning suggests that zoning
ordinances have been held valid because they tend to preserve the historic areas
as tourist attractions and hence have a favorable effect upon business. Yet
those who urged the preservation of historic areas will attest that the primary
motive was quite the contrary. Objection was raised to the immolation of
historic areas to the demands of burgeoning business. A desire existed to
preserve the beauty of these areas quite apart from the incidental economic
benefits resulting thereby. It is time that the courts recognize that the very
preservation of historical monuments, the beauty of the settings in which they
are placed and the beauty of our communities as a whole is an end in itself.
"SPOT ZONING"-A VICIOUS PRACTICE OR A COMMUNITY
BENEFIT
New influences such as the "population explosion," a higher standard of living,
and advances in transportation and communication have created a variety of
new conditions and needs to which present zoning regulations must be ad-
justed. In an effort to meet these changing conditions in their respective com-
munities, municipal planners and zoning commissions have frequently departed
from the earlier theory that each use district should be restricted to one formal
use. In many instances, they have allowed small areas to be zoned for uses which
are inconsistent with the uses permitted in the larger surrounding districts. The
validity of this type of zoning is frequently attacked as "spot zoning."
A MISUSED TERM
The term "spot zoning" has received such wide use that it now has several
meanings. When used as a label to indicate that a particular zoning regulation
is invalid, it has its legal meaning,' "the process of singling out a small parcel
of land for a use classification totally different from that of the surrounding
area, for the benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment of
other owners." 2 The term has also been used by the courts in a broader sense
to describe any limited application of a particular zoning ordinance to an in-
dividual plot or a small area.3 Through liberal use, the term has been expanded
even further to encompass such restrictive land uses as variances, nonconform-
ing uses, and piecemeal original zoning.4 The term "spot zoning" will be used
in this comment in its legal sense.
1. Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263, 266 (1957).
2. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 123, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1951).
3. Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 18 A.2d 856 (1941); Penning v.
Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 (1954) ; State ex rel. Christopher v. Matthews, 362
Mo. 242, 240 S.W.2d 934 (1951). Contra, Winslow v. Zoning Bd., 143 Conn. 381, 122 A.2d
789 (1956); Birdsey v. Wesleyan College, 211 Ga. 583, 87 S.E.2d 378 (1955).
4. See Note, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 Syracuse L. Rev. 303 (1959).
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"SPOT ZONING" Is ESSENTIALLY INVALID
Since its introduction in Europe,5 the practice of restricting land uses, by
dividing municipalites into use districts or zones, has served primarily to protect
residential areas from encroachment by industry and commerce. In this country,
zoning has been sanctioned as a valid exercise of the police power of the state
when it is done to promote public health, safety, morals or the welfare of the
community." "Spot zoning," the "antithesis of planned zonin,"17 is subject to
attack on a dual basis, namely, it may be unconstitutional because it violates
the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions, or it may be
void for want of legislative authority when it does not comply with the require-
ments of the particular state's enabling act.
"Spot zoning," by definition, seeks only to benefit a single property owner or
a select group of owners at the expense of the community as a whole. This type
of zoning is an abuse of the police power delegated by the state to its munici-
palities.8 It is an infringment of the property rights of the many as against a
privileged few. It has therefore been declared arbitrary,10 discriminatory11 or
unreasonable.'- It was this manifest disregard for the community benefit which
prompted one authority to denounce "spot zoning" as a "most vicious practice
that has expanded almost to a point where it has become a cancerous growth on
the body politic in many, many municipalities."' 3
5. For a brief historv of the origins of zoning, see 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice §9
2-7 (2d ed. 1953); Note, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 2S6-S7 (1952).
6. Vllage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Mr. Justice Sutherland
delivered the opinion of the Court upholding the legality of a general zoning ordinance
under attack as violating due process under the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that
zoning is a valid exercise of the police power when reasonably related to public health, safety,
morals and general welfare.
7. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 124, 95 N.E.2d 731, 735 (1951).
S. Municipalities do not have inherent powers to zone. Boozer v. Johnson, 33 Dcl. Ch.
554, 9S A.2d 76 (Ch. 1953); Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722 (1920);
liller v. City of 'Memphis, 181 Tenn. 15, 17S S.W.2d 332 (1944).
9. 1 Yokley, Municipal Corporations § 160 n.153 (1056). Cf. Note, 44 Comell LQ. 450
(1959).
10. Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A-2d 659 (1947) (dictum);
Polk v. Axton, 306 Ky. 493, 203 S.W.2d 497 (1943) ; Deligtisch v. Town of Grcnburgb, 135
N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. CL 1954).
11. Whittemore v. Building Inspector, 313 Mlass. 243, 46 N.E.2d 1016 (1943); Casinari
v. Union City, 1 N.J. Super. 219, 63 A.2d S91 (Super. CL 1949).
12. See Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946); BMhop
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659 (1947). "An ordinance which perma-
nently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpcc2 goes,
it is plain, beyond regulation, and must be recognized as a taking of the propcrty. The only
substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the retric-
tion leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confisca-
tion would relieve him of that burden." Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 273 N.Y. 222,
232, 15 N.E.2d 5S7, 592 (1933). See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). Cf.
Mr. justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
13. 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 91, at 203 (2d cd. 1953).
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The validity of "spot zoning" may also be subject to attack on the secondary
ground that it does not satisfy the requirements of the particular state's ena-
bling act. By limiting the scope of the zoning authority delegated to municipal-
ities to that zoning which is done in accordance with a well-considered com-
prehensive plan,14 a state legislature can give some measure of protection to the
individual property owner. When the enabling act clearly requires conform-
ance to such a plan, the requirement is strictly construed. 15 Contrary zoning
regulations have been held to be void for lack of legislative authority.10
A Well-Considered Comprehensive Plan
Case decisions point up the lack of agreement among the courts in testing
zoning measures for consonance with the enabling mandate of "accordance
with a comprehensive plan." Some courts, adopting a literal approach, have
reached the seemingly Draconian result of invalidating any zoning ordinance
which is not related to an existent over-all community plan which is separate
from the zoning ordinance. 1 A less mechanical reading of the enabling act has
allowed other courts to hold that the statutory requirement is met when the zon-
ing regulation is consistent with the "policy"' 8 of the zoning commission or
where due consideration has been given to the common benefit of a particular
district.' 9 Another frequently accepted construction is the moderate view that
the zoning ordinance is not and need not be an integral part of another plan
which transcends it in scope, but is itself the comprehensive plan contemplated
by the zoning enabling act.20
This lack of agreement as to the construction to be given the statutory re-
quirement has mitigated the effectiveness of the provision so that many muni-
14. Those state enabling acts which had as their model the Standard State Zoning En-
abling Act, recommended by the Department of Commerce in 1926, require that zoning
ordinances and all amendments thereto be drawn "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan." 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 9-1 (3d ed. 1959). "[T]o be valid, a
zoning ordinance must be one which is designed to further a plan which relates to a sub-
stantial area of the municipality enacting it and to the reasonable needs of the community,
both at present and in the foreseeable future. There must be a plan and that plan must be
comprehensive as to territory, public needs and time." Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n v. Zoning
Comm'n, 138 Conn. 434, 439, 86 A.2d 74, 77 (1952).
15. See Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943); Cf. Penning v.
Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 (1954).
16. City of Utica v. Hanna, 202 App. Div. 610, 195 N.Y. Supp. 225 (4th Dep't 1922).
17. Johnson v. City of Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36, 29 So. 2d 342 (1947).
18. Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949).
19. County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946).
20. See Couch v. Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 349, 106 A.2d 173 (1954). See also Bishop
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659 (1947). "The analysis of the 'com-
prehensive plan' requirement in terms of the zoning ordinance itself is a common Judicial
phenomenon. The reasoning seems to be that a comprehensive ordinance, one which blankets
the entire area and is internally consistent, is automatically 'in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan.' The plan is the ordinance, and the ordinance the plan .... " Haar, "In Ac-
cordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1155, 1167 (1955).
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cipalities have enacted zoning legislation without first adopting a master com-
munity plan.
The spot-zoning cases, like those dealing with partial zoning, appear to make the
legislative requirement of accordance with a comprehensive plan in effect a nullity. The
words become merely a supererogatory reminder of the underlying te~t of constitution-
ality. So long as the legislation is reasonably related to the police power, plamibly sening
the ends of health, safety, welfare, or morals, and not demonstrably arbitrary or dis-
criminatory, it will be sustained. To avoid the charge of spot-zoning, the community
must be sure only that in dealing with one land parcel, others similarly situated have been
taken into account. In this sense, "comprehensive" is virtually synonymou vith "uni-
form," the uniformity being in terms either of the ordinance itself or of a generalizcd
plastic "policy."'
DEcISIoNs AiD FuTuRE PLA.zNG
Although the courts have condemned "spot zoning," they have been con-
sistent in pointing out that the zoning of "spots" for inconsistent uses is not
invalid per se.22 Rather it is invalid or valid depending on the circumstances
involved in the particular case.23 Because of the uniqueness of the subject
matter, the courts must decide "spot zoning" cases on a case by case basis.2 1 It
is necessary, therefore, that municipal authorities review recent court decisions
before enacting any inconsistent zoning ordinances or amendments to determine
their probable acceptability.
Econcmical Housing
The recent expansion of the suburbs has resulted, in part, from the natural
increase of their residents and the migration or overflow from heavily con-
jested urban areas. In adjusting to the community need for economical hous-
ing25 which has resulted from the marked increase in population, municipal
authorities have been successful in rezoning residential areas to multi-dwelling
and apartment uses. Changes in conditions within the district is the principal
reason for allowing this type of rezoning,20 but the courts will also consider the
changes in surrounding use districts, 27 or the suitability of the particular land
21. Id. at 1170. Cf. Speakman v. Mayor of No. Plainfield, 3 N.J. 250, 256, S4 A2.d 715,
71S (1951).
22. See Hligbee v. Chicago B.&.Q.R.R, 235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W. 320 (1940). Sra aLa
Deligtisch v. Town of Greensburgh, 135 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. CL 1954).
23. State ex rel. Christopher v. Matthews, 362 Mlo. 242, 240 S.W2d 934 (1951); Shaff-
ner v. City of Salem, 201 Ore. 49, 263 P.2d 599 (1954); Page v. City of Portland, 173 Ore.
632, 165 P.2d 2S0 (1946); Kenny v. Kelly, 254 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
24. Rowland v. City of Racine, 223 Wis. 433, 271 N.W. 36 (1937).
25. Cf. Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 324 Mass. 542, 87 N.E.2d 211 (1949);
Crow v. Town of Westfield, 136 NJ.L. 363, 56 A.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Rodgers v. Village
of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
26. See Wilcox v. City of Pittsburgh, 121 F2d 835 (3d Cir. 1941) (no change in condi-
tions; rezoning invalid). See also City of Mliami v. Ross, 76 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1994). Cf.
Wolpe v. Poretsky, 154 F2d 330 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 US. 724 (1946).
27. Byrn v. Beechwood Village, 253 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1952) (area on edge of residential
district rezoned to apartment ue because abutting on heavily traffched highway and facing
commercial structure across highway); Crow v. Town of Westfield, 136 NJ.L. 3632 56 A.2d
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for the use permitted by the original zoning.2 8 In one case,2 the court, in allow-
ing a "floating zone" to be created for garden apartments in residential districts,
stated:
The Tarrytown board of trustees was entitled to find that there was a real need for
additional housing facilities; that the creation of Residence B-B districts for garden
apartment developments would prevent young families, unable to find accommodations in
the village, from moving elsewhere; would attract business to the community; would
lighten the tax load of the small home owner, increasingly burdened by the shrinkage of
tax revenues resulting from the depreciated value of large estates and the transfer of
many such estates to tax-exempt institutions; and would develop otherwise unmarketable
and decaying property.30
The courts are more prone to approve zoning allowing an inconsistent apart-
ment use where the change in zoning will not be a radical departure from the
use of the surrounding area.31 It is also noteworthy that when dealing with
rezoning to such a use, particular attention will be given to the size of the
"spot" in question.32
Where a residential area has previously been rezoned to apartment use, the
courts will further permit the same areas to be "spotted" with commercial,
cultural, recreational and educational uses so as to form integrated neighbor-
hoods and districts.3 3 In such situations the most frequently used commercial
uses are acceptable, i.e., groceries, drug stores, barber shops, beauty parlors, dry
cleaning shops, filling stations, and the like.34 Special zoning of this type is
403 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (rezoned to apartment use to act as a buffer to protect property value
against less restricted area of adjacent township). See Greenberg v. City of New Rochelle,
206 Misc. 28, 129 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 891, 134 N.Y.S.2d 593 (2d
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 308 N.Y. 736, 124 N.E.2d 716 (1954).
28. Gratton v. Conte, 364 Pa. 578, 73 A.2d 381 (1950) (unsuitable topography for single
family dwellings); Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W.2d 84 (1941) (fill on land
too poor to support single family dwelling).
29. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951), where the
court declared valid two amendments to the general zoning ordinance of defendant village.
The first amendment created a new zone in which garden apartments were permissible, pro-
vided certain standards for such a zone, such as a minimum size plot of ten acres, were
met. The boundaries of the new zone were to be fixed by another amendment of the zone
map when the authorized "floating" zone was applied to specific property. The second
amendment placed only the property of the individual defendant, which was previously
residential, in a new zone for garden apartments.
30. Id. at 122, 96 N.E.2d at 733.
31. Hendlin v. Fairmount Constr. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 310, 72 A.2d 541 (Super. Ct.
1950) (dictum) ; see Hedin v. Board of County Comm'rs 209 Md. 224, 120 A.2d 663 (1956).
Cf. Greenberg v. City of New Rochelle, 206 Misc. 28, 129 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
32. See Crow v. Town of Westfield, 136 N.J.L. 363, 56 A.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; In re
Lieb's Appeal, 179 Pa. Super. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955).
33. Cf. Webster, Urban Planning and Municipal Policy 143-59 (1958).
34. See Temmink v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 205 Md. 489, 109 A.2d 85 (1954); State
ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720 (1927) (dictum).
See also Cassel v. Mayor of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950) (dictum). Cf.
Snow v. Johnston, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270 (1943) (dictum) (funeral home not allowed
in residential area).
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neither irrational nor discriminatory.35 It serves a distinct and insistent social
need,3 6 providing for the accommodation and convenience of the residents of
the districts.3 7 It should be noted, however, that the courts, in deciding the
reasonableness of this type of zoning, look to the needs of the particular dis-
trict,3 8 and the distance from the district of a use capable of satisfying these
needs.39
In many cases of suburban expansion, the need for additional public utilities
also increases in proportion to the rise in population. Special zoning in resi-
dential areas will often be sanctioned to permit restricted uses for those public
utilities which are considered necessary for the additional convenience of the
residents of the district.-" Such inconsistent zoning will also be upheld where
it is reasonable and will best serve the interests of the community as a whole.4 '
Shopping Czters
As the suburban communities have expanded and spread around the original
commercial districts, the time and distance required for daily shopping has
frequently become a burden. Growing municipalities have, in many cases, solved
this problem by "spotting" residential districts with small commercial zones.
This type of special zoning has given rise to the American shopping center.
Residential land may be segregated for use as a shopping center in order to
"maintain in harmonious operation the family home."-2  This will reduce the
time required to do daily shopping, and the traffic congestion in the older, more
limited commercial districts.4 3 A shopping center, because it allows the pedes-
35. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, supra note 34; Goddard v. Stowers
272 S.W.2d 400 (Teax. Civ. App. 1954). See also Fieldston Garden Apartments, Inc. v. City
of New York, 7 MIisc. 2d 147, 145 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1955), affd, 3 App. Div. 2d 903,
163 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1957).
36. Goddard v. Stowers, supra note 35.
37. Temmink v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 205 Md. 4S9, 119 A-2d S5 (1954).
38. See Freeman v. City of Yonkers, 205 Misc. 947, 129 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. CL 1954)
(area doesn't need gas station); Appley v. Tow.'nship Comm., 128 NJ.L. 195, 24 A2d S0S
(Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 129 NJ.L. 73, 28 A.2d 177 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (no need for entsion
of commercial district). Cf. Edgewood Civic Club v. Bladell, 95 N.H. 244, 61 A.2d 517
(194S) (novelty store not necessary).
39. See Bischoff v. Hennessy, 251 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1952) (nearet commercial zhopping
center was 21 miles away); Jones v. Zoning Bd., 32 NJ. Super. 397, 103 A-2d 493 (Super.
CL 1954) (no shopping area within 12 miles, but large increase in population was antid-
pated). Cf. Kuehne v. Town Council, 136 Conn. 452, 72 A.2d 474 (1950); Skinner v. Reed,
265 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
40. Higbee v. Chicago, B.&Q.R.R., 235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W. 320 (1940) (paczonxer depot
permitted in residential area).
41. Holt v. City of Salem, 192 Ore. 20, 234 P.2d 564 (1951) (electric substation in rezi-
dential area for benefit of community). Cf. McNutt Oil & Ref. Co. v. Brools, 244 S.W.2d
872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (truck service center allowed in apartment area to avoid conges-
tion in downtown area).
42. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 711 (1943).
43. See Bartramx v. Zoning Commn, 136 Conn. 89, 6S A.2d 303 (1949); City of Waxa-




trian to shop without the dangers of traffic and because it is convenient to the
surrounding area, can readily be related to the health, safety and public welfare
of the community. But where this type of zoning is done for the sole purpose
of favoring an individual or group 44 or to create a monopoly 4r1 in a particular
area, without regard to the needs of the community, it is invalid.
Gas Stations
The rapid expansion of many of our suburban municipalities has been accom-
panied by a marked rise in private and commercial vehicular traffic. The result-
ing increased demand for filling and service stations has often resulted in the
rezoning of small areas from residential use to restricted use as a gas station.
Such rezoning is approved where there is sufficient evidence of a present or
anticipated need for such a use,46 and where the rezoned area is abutting on an
arterial highway,47 or is located on the corner 48 of a heavily trafficked inter-
section.49
In order to reduce the deleterious effect of this type of rezoning upon the sur-
rounding residential property, some zoning regulations require compliance with
special protective provisions before the rezoned plot may be used as a gas
station.50 These special provisions have been upheld by the courts against
attack as "contract zoning." 5' Because of the frequently unfavorable effects
of such rezoning, considerable and weighty evidence is needed to demonstrate
its reasonableness.
52
44. Ellicott v. Mayor of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942); De Blasils v.
Bartell, 143 Pa. Super. 485, 18 A.2d 478 (1941); Huebner v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y,
127 Pa. Super. 28, 192 AtI. 139 (1937). Cf. McNutt Oil & Ref. Co. v. Brooks, 244 S.W.2d
872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (mere incidental benefit to property owner does not invalidate In-
consistent zoning, where it is required by public need).
45. Wickham v. Becker, 96 Cal. App. 443, 274 Pac. 397 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929). See
Linden Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Linden, 113 N.J.L. 188, 173 At. 593 (Sup. Ct.
1934) ; Huebner v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y, supra note 44.
46. See Ellicott v. Mayor of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942) (nearest gas
station /2 mile away). "So long as this district continues zoned for residential purposes, It
must be dealt with as a residential district, and the segregation of a lot within It for a
commercial use must be dealt with as a discrimination. Not all discriminations are, however,
departures from the authority of the enabling act, or unconstitutional." Id. at § -, 23 A.2d
at 652.
47. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d. 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
Cf. Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 Ill. 212, 185 N.E. 827 (1933) (abutting on railway right of
way).
48. Ellicott v. Mayor of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942).
49. Cf. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943).
50. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960),
affirming 8 App. Div. 2d 962, 190 N.Y.S.2d 927 (2d Dep't 1959). The change in zoning was
granted upon conditions that the owners execute restrictive covenants as to the maximum
area to be occupied by buildings and as to fence and shrubbery.
51. Church v. Town of Islip, supra note 50.
52. Cf. State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash. 2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952) (mere fact




The increased expense of supplying proper municipal service to an expanded
community has prompted municipal planners to seek effective means of attract-
ing new business and of increasing tax revenue. In recent years attention has
been focused upon the reasonableness of zoning which permits industry in
districts previously zoned for residential use. This type of zoning has been
permitted in the past only under special conditions. The most acceptable
situation is one where a sparsely developed area, zoned for rural residential use,
is "spotted" to allow special areas for industrial use.6 An industrial "spot '
may also be valid where the land is unfit for the originally zoned residential
use,54 or where industrial use is the best possible use that can be made of the
land. 5 Conditions in the surrounding area play an important role in the
court's decision. Approval is normally given in those cases where the rezoned
land abuts on a heavily trafficked highway, 1c is adjacent to a railway sidingc7
or is opposite another industrial use in a neighboring district.P3
New developments can be expected in regard to this type of rezoning. The
earlier antipathy toward industry in or near residential districts is being pro-
gressively mitigated as advances in smoke control, sound proofing, and plant
design become perfected. Small, clean, specialized industries can now bring
to a growing community the advantages of new business, increased employ-
ment and greater tax revenues without the disadvantages of smog, noise, glare,
and traffic. With proper planning and adequate protective provisionsP in re-
plot in question for gas station). See Freeman v. City of Yonkers, 205 Misc. 947, 129
N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
53. See Kutcher v. Town Planning Comm'n, 133 Conn. 705, 03 A.2d 533 (1952).
54. Hills v. Zoning Conma'n, 139 Conn. 603, 96 A.2d 212 (1953) (held to be merely an
eztension of e:isting industrial zone to residential area adjoining railroad right of way and
no longer fit for residential use); State ex rel. Christopher v. Mattbev;s, 362 Mo. 242, 240
S.W.2d 934 (1951) (area rezoned for electrical generating plant, Eince not fit for rec=dcntial
use because of flooding). Cf. Schmidt v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd., 32 Pa. 521, 114 A2d 902
(1955) (originally industrial; zoned residential; rezoned to industrial). Cf. Graham v. Gray-
bar Elec. Co., 15S Neb. 527, 63 N.W.2d 774 (1954).
55. See State ex rel. Christopher v. Matthews, supra note 54; Schmidt v. Philadelphia
Zoning Bd., supra note 54.
56. Cf. Hermann v. Incorporated Village of East Hills, 104 N.Y.S2d 592 (Sup. CL),
afi'd, 279 App. Div. 753, 109 NY.S.2d 132 (2d Dep't 1951).
57. See Hills v. Zoning Comm'n, 139 Conn. 603, 96 A-2d 212 (1953); Offutt v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 204 Ald. 551, 105 A.2d 219 (1954). Cf. Hermann v. Incorporatcd Viluga
of East Hills, supra note 56.
5S. Raymond v. Commissioner, 333 Mass. 410, 131 N.E2d 139 (1956) ; Partain v. City of
Brooklyn, 101 Ohio App. 279, 133 N.E2d 616 (1956) (bordered on district in adjoining
municipality which had always been zoned for industrial use). See also EchlLn & Bros. v.
Mayor of Kearny, 31 N.J. Super. 30, 105 A.2d 394 (Super. Ct 1954).
59. See Nappi v. LaGuardia, 134 Misc. 775, 55 N.Y.S2d 20 (Sup. CL 1944), affd, 269
App. Div. 693, 54 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't), affd, 295 N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716 (1945). Cf.
Sieber v. Laawe, 33 N.J. Super. 115, 109 A.2d 470 (Super. Ct. 1954).
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zoning ordinances, it would appear that the courts would more readily accept
rezoning for industrial use in residential districts.
BOUNDARY REZONING
In discussing "spot zoning" as related to suburban expansion, it is important
to realize that the municipality's responsibility toward property owners extends
beyond the municipal boundaries. In situations where a municipality has re-
zoned a "spot" which abuts, or is very near to its boundary lines, the character
of the contiguous districts must be considered along with the needs of the re-
zoning municipality. 60 There is a duty owing to the adjacent property owners
in the adjoining municipality. Their rights must be considered along with the
rights of the residents and taxpayers of the rezoning municipality. "To do
less would be to make a fetish out of invisible municipal boundary lines and a
mockery of the principles of zoning. '6 1
CONCLUSION
"Spot zoning" is universally recognized as an abuse of the zoning power.02
If it were not held in check by municipal authorities and condemned by the
courts, it would tend to produce conditions almost as chaotic as existed before
zoning. 63 It is equally important to realize, however, that the purpose of zon-
ing is not to place the municipality in a zoned strait-jacket, but rather to give
direction and control to the course of its development.0 4 Municipalities should
be encouraged to exercise their power to enact or to amend zoning ordinances
so that land uses may be adapted to changing conditions. The danger of "spot
zoning" should guide but not inhibit such readjustment. The best protection
from "spot zoning" would seem to be a clear and definite statutory require-
ment that all zoning should be in accord with an existing, current, community-
wide plan which is separate from the zoning ordinance. Such a plan would not
only reduce arbitrary and discriminatory zoning, but would also, through con-
scientious and continued re-evaluation and revision, indicate potential problem
areas which could be corrected. 65
60. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). See
Partain v. City of Brooklyn, 101 Ohio App. 279, 133 N.E.2d 616 (1956).
61. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, supra note 60, at 247, 104 A.2d at 446.
62. See State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash. 2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952).
63. Cassel v. Mayor of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950). See Bassett, Zon-
ing 122 (1940).
64. Cf. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y. Supp. 229 (4th
Dep't (1932).
65. The basic community plan should be reviewed regularly to insure that it provides
sound solutions to local problems and sound goals for future development. Communities
change because of internal and external influences. Comprehensive plans must adjust to the
change; and in turn, seek to utilize the change to the communities' advantage. This means
that planning is more than a collection of officially approved documents; it is a continuing
process.
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